Generally speaking, under the ‘final judgment rule,’ a party can only appeal a final judgment—a decision that fully decides and disposes of the whole case, leaving no further questions for future consideration. This judicial doctrine, however, is subject to exceptions. In certain circumstances, a party may be able to take an interlocutory appeal of a non-final order. This rule and its exceptions have previously been a subject of comment on this blog (here and here).
The parameters of the exceptions to the final judgment rule are themselves noteworthy, but so is another question: if one party can successfully invoke an exception to the final judgment rule, do other parties to the proceeding have the right to challenge other interlocutory orders issued by the trial court? The Law Court’s recent decision in Fama v. Bob’s LLC touches on this issue.
In Fama, Laureen Fama brought wrongful death claims against both Bob’s LLC and Robert Clarke. Clarke filed a summary judgment motion, claiming immunity from suit because Fama had elected to receive a workers’ compensation lump sum settlement. Bob’s LLC also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against it must necessarily be dismissed if Clarke was immune from suit. The Superior Court denied both motions; appeals followed even though there was no final judgment. The Law Court, however, took up the appeals.
Applying its prior precedent, the Court concluded that the “death knell” exception applied to Clarke’s appeal because he could assert a claim for immunity and the loss of that immunity from suit would result in irreparable harm if he were forced to litigate the case to its conclusion.
One could imagine that, once the Court took up Clarke’s appeal, it should also automatically take up the issues separately raised by Bob’s LLC—after all, the Court would be taking up some of issues presented by the trial court’s rulings, so why not all? But the Court’s decision in Fama makes it clear that this is not how the analysis works. As the Court concluded, “just because Clarke’s appeal falls within the death knell exception, it does not follow that we should entertain Bob’s LLC’s interlocutory appeal.” Rather, “an independent reason for interlocutory review is needed to support Bob’s LLC’s immediate appeal.” The Court ultimately held that the judicial economy exception applied to Bob’s LLC’s appeal because review of the appeal could finally dispose of the entire case.
The Law Court’s decision is straightforward and eminently reasonable. It does, however, raise a theoretical question: if an appeal of an interlocutory order is accepted, would it be a sensible rule to conclude that all issues that could be presented by another party relating an interlocutory order should also be addressed—regardless of whether a separate exception applied? One could make arguments on both sides of that question. Certainly, judicial efficiency would seem to be served (and litigation costs potentially reduced) by such an approach, because it would clarify important issues earlier in the case. On the other hand, one could argue, failing to require a separate exception for each party’s appeal might violate principles of judicial restraint because it could require the Law Court to reach issues before it became absolutely necessary to do so.
Though one could argue that each party’s appeal should not have to separately satisfy an exception to the final judgment rule, Fama clearly establishes that this is not the rule. Practitioners and parties, therefore, should pay close heed to demonstrating why their issues should be heard on appeal if another party is able to take advantage of an opportunity for interlocutory appeal.