In Naz v. Wright, (DC Cir., June 9, 2026), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision reversed a district court’s dismissal of a religious discrimination claim brought by a Muslim woman of Pakistani origin who was fired from her position at the Department of Energy. The majority said in part:
Naz alleged that, in May or June 2019, she asked Gross—who by then had become her supervisor—whether during the month of Ramadan, he could adjust the start time of their weekly team meetings by 30 minutes and grant her a flexible work schedule to accommodate her religious observance…. But “instead of accommodating m[y] request,” Naz alleges, Gross “bluntly replied to me that [the Department] is a workplace, not a religious institution, and he does not believe in Islamic religious extremism.” …
The district court’s opinion, though, does not expressly take account of Naz’s allegation about Gross’s statement. Granted, Naz did not include the allegation in her complaint, instead stating it in her opposition to the Department’s motion to dismiss. But as noted, our precedents generally call for considering a pro se plaintiff’s allegations in an opposition to a dismissal motion even if they are not in the complaint….
Judge Katsas filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:
… [M]y colleagues vacate the dismissal of the discrimination claims, based on a contestable argument raised neither by Naz nor by the amicus curiae whom we appointed to support her position. Specifically, my colleagues conclude that the district court erred in not plucking an allegation out of Naz’s 148-page opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss, deeming that allegation to be part of Naz’s complaint, and then considering whether it tipped the balance against dismissal. Rather than inject that contention into this appeal, I would instead apply ordinary party-presentation principles, which compel an affirmance….
HRD reports on the decision.