On July 14, 2026, the Seventh Circuit became the first federal appellate court to hold that text messages are not “telephone calls” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (“TCPA”) private right of action for violations of the federal Do Not Call rules. The decision provides businesses operating in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin with a significant defense to claims based solely on unwanted marketing texts. It does not, however, eliminate private TCPA claims involving text messages or create a general safe harbor for text marketing.[1]
This is a pivot away from prevailing Federal Communications Commission interpretation of the TCPA, made possible, in part, by the directive in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo[2] and McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs. v. McKesson Corp[3] for federal district courts to independently determine whether a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct instead of providing deference.
The plaintiffs alleged that Blackstone Medical Services continued sending them marketing texts and telephone calls after they replied “STOP” and registered their numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. They sued under Section 227(c)(5), which permits a private action by a person who receives more than one “telephone call” within a 12-month period in violation of regulations issued under that subsection.
The Seventh Circuit held that Section 227(c)(5) does not authorize private claims based on text messages. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “telephone call” when Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991 involved communication through sound. It also emphasized that Congress used the broader term “telephone solicitation” elsewhere in Section 227(c) and defined that term to include both a “call” and a “message.” By using only “telephone call” in the private right of action, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Congress created a narrower remedy that excludes texts.
Which Private Causes of Action Remain?
Although Steidinger forecloses one avenue of relief within the Seventh Circuit, it does not eliminate private enforcement of the TCPA for unwanted communications. The decision is limited to claims under Section 227(c)(5) based solely on text messaging. Depending on the type of communication, the technology used, and the applicable law, plaintiffs may still pursue several other private causes of action:
- Do Not Call claims based on actual telephone calls remain available. Section 227(c)(5) still authorizes private claims when a consumer receives more than one prohibited telephone call from the same entity within a 12-month period. Although the Steidinger plaintiffs alleged that they received both calls and texts, they did not argue that their claims could proceed based on the calls alone. The Seventh Circuit therefore did not address or eliminate that theory.
- Private claims under Section 227(b) remain available. Section 227(b)(3) separately authorizes private actions for violations of the TCPA’s restrictions on communications made using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice without the required consent. Steidinger expressly distinguished cases involving Section 227(b) and did not decide whether text messages qualify as calls under that subsection. Plaintiffs may therefore continue pursuing claims involving texts that allegedly satisfy Section 227(b)’s technology and consent requirements.
- State law private claims also remain. The decision does not preempt or otherwise eliminate claims under state telemarketing statutes that expressly regulate text messages. Indeed, the Steidinger plaintiffs also asserted a claim under the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act. The district court dismissed that claim only after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, not because the state law claim failed on the merits. Businesses conducting nationwide text campaigns must therefore continue evaluating potentially applicable state laws.
The Circuit Split Continues
The decision also creates a significant appellate divide over whether a text message constitutes a “call” under the TCPA. The Ninth Circuit held that a text message is a “call” because it is an attempt to communicate by telephone.[4] The Ninth Circuit ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s Section 227(b) claim because the recipient had to press play before hearing the prerecorded voice contained in an attached video, but it expressly treated the text itself as a call.
The split is not perfectly symmetrical because Steidinger interpreted Section 227(c)(5), while Howard interpreted Section 227(b). Nevertheless, the decisions adopt conflicting interpretations of whether the ordinary meaning of a TCPA “call” encompasses text messages. Other appellate decisions have also treated texts as calls in cases arising under Section 227(b). As a result, potential liability will continue to depend heavily on the statutory provision asserted and the jurisdiction in which the claim is filed.
Key Takeaway
Businesses should view Steidinger as a narrow limitation on one private cause of action, not as permission to disregard text marketing requirements. Companies should continue obtaining and documenting appropriate consent, promptly honoring opt-out requests, maintaining internal suppression lists, and assessing campaigns under Section 227(b) and applicable state laws. Until the appellate divide is resolved, nationwide compliance programs should continue following the more restrictive approach.
Further, following 2021’s Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid narrowing of Section 227(b)’s application by restricting the definition of “automatic telephone dialing systems,” U.S. states have begun enacting state-level text messaging rules that exceed TCPA requirements to fill the consumer protection gap. We can expect this trend to accelerate if other courts adopt a similarly narrow view of Section 227(c)(5).
[1] Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026).
[2] 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024).
[3] 14 S. Ct. 2006, 2015 (2025).
[4] In Howard v. Republican National Committee, 164 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2026).